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Abstract—Distribution locational marginal pricing (DLMP) 
can adversely affect users in a grid-constrained transactive 
distribution system market (DSM) that are at a distance away 
from the substation, requiring longer paths to connect to the 
substation. When the grid operates closer to its physical limits in 
terms of line capacities and voltage deviations, these users are 
more likely to cause grid violations than others in the vicinity of 
the substation. Conversely, increased energy consumption by 
users near the substation can choke off the supply to those at the 
grid’s extremities. This research describes a novel mechanism to 
charge users in a more equitable manner, by regularizing the 
distribution system operator (DSO)’s social welfare based 
objective function with a fairness criterion. The Jain’s index of 
fairness is used in this context and corresponding fairness DLMP 
component is derived. The overall problem entails the 
maximization of the regularized objective within a set of linear 
constraints. The constraints that ensure that the grid’s voltage and 
line power limits are not violated. Constrained optimization is 
carried out in an iterative manner through dual decomposition 
where the dual variables and unit costs are incrementally updated 
by the DSO using the augmented Lagrangian method (ALM). 
Simulations reported in this study confirm the effectiveness of the 
proposed approach. 
Index Terms—Transactive energy, distribution market, 
distribution locational marginal price, distributed energy 
resources, grid constraints, augmented lagrangian method, dual 
decomposition, fairness, Jain’s index. 
I.  NOMENCLATURE 
𝒩    Set of nodes, lines |𝒩| = 𝑁  
𝒜     Set of nodes with aggregators, |𝒜| = 𝐴 
𝑘, 𝑙    Node indices, 𝑘, 𝑙 ∈ 𝒩 
𝓊(𝑘)   Index of 𝑘’s immediate upstream (parent) node 
𝒹(𝑘)    Set of 𝑘’s immediate downstream nodes 
𝑟𝑘 , 𝑥𝑘    Resistance, reactance of line (𝓊(𝑘), 𝑘), 𝑘 ∈ 𝒩 
𝑝𝑘 , 𝑞𝑘   Real, reactive power injection into node, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒜 
𝑐𝑘     Per unit cost of nodeπ 𝑘 ∈ 𝒜 
𝑃𝑘 , 𝑄𝑘 ,    Real, reactive line power flows 𝑘 ∈ 𝒩 
𝐿𝑘
𝑃 , 𝐿𝑘
𝑄
     Real, reactive losses 𝑘 ∈ 𝒩 
𝑉𝑘 , 𝛿𝑘      Voltage, angle of node 𝑘 ∈ 𝒜 
𝜖     Maximum allowable pu voltage deviation 
𝓊(∙)     Immediate upstream node 
𝒹(∙),    Set of immediate downstream nodes 
𝒰(∙),    Set of all upstream nodes of given node 
𝐃, 𝐓    Downstream and tree matrices 
𝒢𝑘    Set of agents at aggregator𝑘, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒜, 𝐺𝑘 = |𝒢𝑘| 
𝑖     Index of agent 𝑖 ∈ 𝒢𝑘  
𝑝𝑘
𝑖 , 𝑞𝑘
𝑖    Real and reactive demands of 𝑖 ∈ 𝒢𝑘 
𝑔𝑘
𝑖 , 𝑎𝑘
𝑖 , 𝑏𝑘
𝑖   Generation and utility parameters of 𝑖 ∈ 𝒢𝑘 
𝛂, ?̅?, 𝛃, 𝜆, 𝛾  Dual variables 
𝐜𝐶 , 𝐜𝑉   DLMP components for congestion, voltage 
𝐜𝐸+𝐿 , 𝐜𝐹  DLMP components for energy and loss, fairness 
Ω(∙)    System level objective function 
𝒲𝑘(∙)   Social welfare of aggregator 𝑘 ∈ 𝒜 
𝑢𝑘
𝑖 (∙)   Utility of 𝑖 ∈ 𝒢𝑘 
𝜋𝑘
𝑖 (∙)   Payoff of 𝑖 ∈ 𝒢𝑘 
𝔏(∙)    Lagrange function 
𝐽(∙)    Jain’s index of fairness 
𝜂     Increment factor per iteration 
𝐶     Regularization weight 
 
In this list, only the main symbols used throughout the paper 
are shown. Other symbols are abstract combinations of these 
symbols or explained in the text. Bold lowercase and bold, italic 
uppercase symbols represent vectors while bold uppercase 
symbols represent matrices.   
II.  INTRODUCTION 
HE rapid proliferation of distributed energy resources 
(DERs) in the energy grid necessitates the need for the 
design of efficient transactive distribution system markets 
(DSMs). Pricing mechanisms that are compatible with the 
physical structure of the distribution grid and take operation 
limits into account, are being proposed in the literature [1]-[6]. 
Distribution locational marginal pricing (DLMP) as an effective 
means to establish the price of electricity in transactive DSMs 
has received significant research attention [2]-[6].  
The latest research on DLMP-based pricing decompose 
locational prices to its energy, losses, voltage violation, and 
congestion components, [4], [5]. An inherent drawback of this 
method is the spatial variations in the resulting DLMP. When 
the grid is under stress (e.g., due to a line congestion or a node 
voltage hitting its operation limit), the DLMP-based pricing 
intrinsically charges distant nodes at higher rates than those 
closer to the substation. In particular, the effect of location in 
DLMP is substantially high if an extreme node violates the 
voltage constraint due to higher voltage drop. 
 In this paper, we propose a novel method that addresses the 
issue of fairness in DLMP-based DSM. We propose a fairness-
regularized mechanism that can be implemented by the 
distribution system operator (DSO). An iterative gradient 
descent algorithm based on dual decomposition maximizes the 
global social welfare of the grid, but with spatially driven 
discrepancies in how the prosumers within the aggregators are 
charged. Incorporating fairness into the algorithms objective 
has a demonstrably beneficial effect on the unit costs. 
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A.  Related Work 
DLMP-based pricing methods and its DSM models either use 
DCOPF or a variant of AC optimal power flow (ACOPF) to set 
grid and operation limit constraints. A few papers on DCOPF-
based DLMP formulations have appeared [2], [7], and [8]. 
References [2] and [7], propose DLMP-based methods through 
quadratic programming and chance-constrained mixed integer 
programming that use DCOPF to define line congestion and 
alleviate it through dynamic tariffs. The work in [8] proposes 
two benchmark pricing methodologies, namely DLMP and  
iterative DLMP (iDLMP), for a congestion free energy 
management by buildings providing flexible demand. 
Aggregators are assumed to have contracts with flexible 
buildings to decide their reserve and energy schedule by 
interacting with the DSO in a cost optimal manner in order to 
avoid congestion in the distribution grid. Unfortunately, due to 
lower x/r ratio in the distribution system, DCOPF-based 
DLMP has been shown to introduce significant errors [3]. 
Moreover, these techniques lack certain key features such as 
losses, voltage deviations, and reactive power pricing essential 
in transactive DSM. 
ACOPF-based DLMP formulation to determine one or more 
of its constituents such as energy, loss, voltage violation, and 
congestion prices are investigated in [3], [4], [5]. In [3], a novel 
LPF method is proposed. In this paper, real and reactive energy 
and loss portions of the DLMP are derived. In [4], a DSM model 
with DLMP clearing has been proposed to manage congestion 
and provide voltage support. This paper uses a mixed-integer 
second-order-cone programming to model ACOPF, and 
determines binary variables such as feeder configuration status 
and tap locations of shunt capacitors and transformers. 
Similarly, in [5], authors use a trust-region based solution 
methodology to obtain DLMP and its constituents through a 
first-order approximation of the AC power flow manifold 
model in [5]. This paper shows better performance over [3]. 
What is absent from the above research is the issue of 
fairness in DLMP pricing mechanisms. Fairness considerations 
in other forms of pricing have begun to be addressed recently. 
Several papers, [9]-[12] make use of the Shapley value, a 
concept borrowed from coalitional game theory, to accomplish 
fairness. In [9] prosumers’ fair hourly billings is achieved 
depending on how the DR meet system objectives. The price of 
anarchy, which is the deviation of the Nash equilibrium 
operating point from the optimal has been used to incorporate 
fairness in hourly billings to prosumers in [13], and as a basis 
for comparing two models of demand side management in 
terms of fairness in [14]. A method to determine fair energy 
costs to consumers based on their contribution to minimize 
overall system costs is proposed in [10]. Several fairness 
criteria based on emission minimization, minimize peak-to-
average ratio, etc. have been proposed in [15]. In [11], a pricing 
during direct trade among prosumers energy is proposed using 
the Shapley value. A fairness-based criterion is proposed in [12] 
to share the cost savings in a coalition of prosumers equipped 
with renewable energy sources and energy storage systems. 
The aim of these approaches is to reward users that consume 
energy during more desirable time intervals and conversely, to 
penalize those that demand energy during undesirable periods. 
We term this aspect of fairness as temporal fairness. The 
expectation of temporal fairness is typically to redirect the 
grid’s operation towards more feasible operating regions. 
Unfortunately, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, other 
aspects of fairness in pricing mechanisms is absent from these 
efforts. Energy consumption by a group of users in one area of 
the grid affects how the other users in the grid are priced. For 
instance, when consumers in a node that is positioned close to 
the substation transformer draw a disproportionately large 
amount of energy, the amounts that those further downstream 
can obtain from the grid is stymied. It is this relative advantage 
or drawback of the end users, which is based on their locations 
that this research proposes to mitigate. It does so by 
incorporating another form of fairness, which we term as spatial 
fairness. Spatial fairness can be best included within DLMP 
pricing. None of the existing papers in the available literature 
address the issue of spatial fairness in DLMP pricing. 
Additionally, most of the studies require some sort of off-the-
shelf solver to compute DLMP and the shadow prices of the 
constraints in their optimization models [3], [5].  
B.  Technical Contributions 
The key contributions of the approach proposed in this paper 
are summarized below. 
(i) The proposed DLMP pricing mechanism addresses spatial 
fairness. This is accomplished by incorporating a 
regularization term in the system level objective function 
(addressed below). The Jain’s index of fairness has been 
used for this purpose. Jain’s index is an instance of a 
general class of fairness criteria that possess desirable 
features [16], [17]that render them particularly well-suited 
for user-centric resource allocation applications [18]. 
Furthermore, unlike its use as an evaluative tool [19] or as 
a system constraint [20], the proposed approach 
successfully includes Jain’s index directly within the 
optimization algorithm, as well as in the DLMP pricing. 
(ii) The proposed framework accommodates physical 
constraints of the grid. It uses a linearized power flow 
method. Similar approaches have been used elsewhere [1], 
[5], [21], [22]. Linearizing the power flow in this research, 
which is directly based on [3], not only helps in 
simplifying the underlying computations, but also allows 
the components of the DLMP to be readily available.  
(iii)  Prosumers in this framework are not required to reveal 
private information despite having their own DGs and 
individual utility functions. The only information 
exchange taking place between individual prosumers and 
the rest of the grid is limited to placing power demand bids 
in response to unit energy costs, i.e. DLMPS. 
(iv) If the regularization term is neglected, the proposed 
method maximizes the social welfare of all prosumers in 
the grid, i.e. the sum of all their utilities. It should be noted 
that this task is accomplished at the DSO level despite its 
lack of access to the nonlinear utility functions of 
individual prosumers. The proof that the maximum social 
welfare is attained without regularization appears in a 
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preliminary version of one aspect of this research [23]. 
(v)  The proposed approach is a bi-level mechanism, with the 
DSO and the prosumers aiming to maximize different 
objectives. Prosumers are modeled as selfish agents that 
aim to maximize their individual payoffs, i.e. the 
difference between their utilities from consuming energy 
and the cost of procuring it from the grid (with negative 
demands indicating supply). Aggregators act as the 
interface between prosumers and the grid  
(vi) The underlying optimization is based on dual 
decomposition. It uses the augmented Lagrangian method  
[24] at the DSO level for social welfare maximization, 
obviating the need for off-the-shelf solvers. 
The rest of this paper is organized in the following manner. 
Section III provides details of the components of the framework 
adopted in this research, as well as the information flowing 
between them. A rigorous treatment of the DSO mechanism is 
postponed until Section IV next, which provides mathematical 
details of the linearized power flow equations, the Jain’s 
fairness index as used here, followed by the overall formulation 
of the optimization problem. Section V describes the results 
obtained from simulation experiments. Finally, Section VI 
concludes this study.  
III.  FRAMEWORK 
The overall schematic of the bi-level mechanism is depicted 
in Fig. 1. At the upper level is the DSO which acts as the 
intermediary between the grid and the wholesale market. The 
DSO possesses physical information pertaining to the 
distribution grid and exchanges unit cost and power demand 
signals from each aggregator, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒜. Aggregators are located 
at some nodes of the grid, which follows a tree structured 
layout. Only a subset 𝒜 of 𝒩 contain aggregators. Each 
aggregator 𝑘 contains a set 𝒢𝑘 of prosumers within a physical 
neighborhood. The information flow between an aggregator 
and its prosumers again pertain to unit costs and demands. 
 
Fig. 1. Schematic of the functional components of the grid and 
the bi-level flow of information between them.  
A.  Prosumer Agent 
In a transactive DSM, contemporary retail customers are 
key stakeholders – prosumer agents in this framework. Each 
prosumer 𝑖 ∈ 𝒢𝑘 incorporates a utility function that may be 
construed as a measure of the satisfaction it derives from using 
a certain amount of energy. The utility 𝑢𝑘
𝑖 : ℝ+ → ℝ+ of 
prosumer 𝑖 is a concave and strictly increasing function that is 
continuous and differentiable. In this research, the utilities have 
been modeled as logarithmic functions of the following form, 
𝑢𝑘
𝑖 (𝑥) = 𝑎𝑘
𝑖 log(𝑏𝑘
𝑖 𝑥 + 1) . (1) 
This is shown in Fig 2. The quantities 𝑎𝑘
𝑖  and 𝑏𝑘
𝑖   are prosumer 
specific constants, while 𝑥 is its load. It must be emphasized 
that the analytical treatment throughout this paper can handle 
any other utility function with the above characteristics. 
Prosumers in this framework may be equipped with their 
own PV panels, thus capable of generating an amount of energy 
𝑔𝑘
𝑖  so that its net power demand is the difference between 𝑥 and 
generation, 𝑔𝑘
𝑖  as, 
𝑝𝑘
𝑖 = 𝑥 − 𝑔𝑘
𝑖 . (2) 
All parameters associated with each prosumer (𝑎𝑘
𝑖 , 𝑏𝑘
𝑖 , 𝑔𝑘
𝑖 ) as 
well as the choice of utility functions remain hidden from the 
rest of the grid.  
As selfish agents, prosumers try to maximize their payoffs, 
which is the difference between the utility obtained from 
energy use and the cost of procurement. With 𝑐𝑘 being the unit 
cost provided to the agent, its strategy can be formulated as 
the following constrained optimization problem, 
Maximize w.r.t. 𝑝𝑘
𝑖 : 
𝜋𝑘
𝑖 (𝑝𝑘
𝑖 ) = 𝑢𝑘
𝑖 (𝑝𝑘
𝑖 + 𝑔𝑘
𝑖 ) − 𝑐𝑘𝑝𝑘
𝑖 . (3𝑎) 
Subject to: 
𝑝𝑘
𝑖 + 𝑔𝑘
𝑖 ≥ 0. (3𝑏) 
Using (2), it can be shown that the demand is, 
 
𝑝𝑘
𝑖 = max (
𝑎𝑘
𝑖 𝑏𝑘
𝑖 − 𝑐𝑘
𝑐𝑘𝑏𝑘
𝑖
, 0) − 𝑔𝑘
𝑖 . (4) 
 
 
Fig. 2 Utility of a prosumer as a function of energy consumed. 
B.  Aggregator 
The aggregators in 𝒜 are intermediary entities between their 
prosumers and the DSO, their role being primarily 
communicative. Each aggregator 𝑘 receives a unit cost signal 
from the latter, that it sends to the agents in 𝒢𝑘. The prosumers’ 
response is the corresponding demand 𝑝𝑘
𝑖  as obtained from (3), 
or with logarithmic utilities, from (4). The social welfare at each 
aggregator is the sum of the utilities of all its prosumers, and 
given by, 
𝒲𝑘(𝐩𝑘) = ∑ 𝑢𝑘
𝑖 (𝑝𝑘
𝑖 + 𝑔𝑘
𝑖 )
𝑖∈𝐺𝑘
. (5) 
In the above expression, 𝐩𝑘 = [𝑝𝑘
𝑖 ]𝑖∈𝒢𝑘 .  Neglecting the 
constraint in (3b) it can be seen that,  
𝜕
𝜕𝑝𝑘
𝒲𝑘(𝐩𝑘) = 𝑐𝑘 .      (6) 
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This shows that the aggregator 𝑘 responds to the DSO’s unit 
cost 𝑐𝑘 with an aggregate energy demand 𝑝𝑘 = 𝟏𝐺𝑘
T 𝐩𝑘 (𝐺𝑘 =
|𝒢𝑘|) such that the slope of 𝒲𝑘 is 𝑐𝑘. This information from all 
aggregators allows the DSO to construct the gradient 
∇𝐩[𝒲𝑘(𝑝𝑘)]𝑘∈𝒜  required for its optimization algorithm (for 
further details, one is referred to [23]). 
C.  DSO 
The DSO’s role is in realizing the underlying optimization 
algorithm. It receives power demand as the vector 𝐩 =
[𝑝𝑘]𝑘∈𝒜  from the set 𝒜 of aggregators and returns the DLMP 
𝐜 = [𝑐𝑘]𝑘∈𝒜  to the latter. Further details of the DSO are 
described in the next section. 
 
Fig. 3. Distribution system radial branch model. 
IV.  MATHEMATICAL MODEL 
A.  Linearized AC Power Flow 
The schematic in Fig. 3 shows a segment of the radial 
distribution network. Each node is labeled with an index 𝑘 ∈
𝒩 . Line indices are identical to those of the nodes at their 
receiving ends. With 𝑝𝑘  and 𝑞𝑘  being the active and reactive 
power injected at any node 𝑘, the active and reactive power 
flowing through the line 𝑘  are given by the following 
expressions, 
𝑃𝑘 = 𝑝𝑘 + ∑ 𝐿𝑙
𝑃
𝑙∈𝒟(𝑘)
+ ∑ 𝑝𝑙
𝑙∈𝒟(𝑘)∩𝒜
, (7𝑎) 
𝑄𝑘 = 𝑞𝑘 + ∑ 𝐿𝑙
𝑄
𝑙∈𝒟(𝑘)
+ ∑ 𝑞𝑙
𝑙∈𝒟(𝑘)∩𝒜
. (7𝑏) 
Here, 𝒟(𝑘) is the set of all nodes that are downstream of node 
𝑘 . The quantities 𝐿𝑘
𝑃  and 𝐿𝑘
𝑄
 are the active and reactive line 
losses, that are computed as follows, 
𝐿𝑘
𝑃 = 𝑟𝑘
𝑃𝑘
2 + 𝑄𝑘
2
𝑉𝑘
2 ,                      (8𝑎) 
𝐿𝑘
𝑄 = 𝑥𝑘
𝑃𝑘
2 + 𝑄𝑘
2
𝑉𝑘
2 .                     (8𝑏) 
In (8), 𝑉𝑘  is the voltage at node 𝑘  while 𝑟𝑘  and 𝑥𝑘  are the 
corresponding line resistance and reactance. Letting 𝑷 =
[𝑃𝑘]𝑘∈𝒜  and 𝑸 = [𝑄𝑘]𝑘∈𝒜 , it follows from (6) that, 
𝑷 = (𝐈 + 𝐓)𝐩 + 𝐓𝑳𝑃, (9𝑎) 
𝑸 = (𝐈 + 𝐓)𝐪 + 𝐓𝑳𝑄 . (9𝑏) 
In the above, the vector 𝐩 = [𝑝𝑘]𝑘∈𝒜  may be regarded as an 
|𝒩| × 1 vector with zeros occupying every place 𝑘 where 𝑘 ∉
𝒜 , 𝐈  is the 𝑁 × 𝑁  identity matrix. The 𝑁 × 𝑁  tree matrix 𝐓 
therein is defined as, 
[𝐓]𝑘,𝑙∈𝒩 = {
1,
0,
  
       𝑙 ∈ 𝒟(𝑘),   
      otherwise.
 
The real and reactive powers at the sending end of line 𝑘 are 
given by the following expressions, 
𝑃𝑘 + 𝐿𝑘
𝑃 =  
𝑟𝑘𝑉𝓊(𝑘)(𝑉𝓊(𝑘) − 𝑉𝑘 cos(𝛿𝓊(𝑘) − 𝛿𝑘))
𝑟𝑘
2 + 𝑥𝑘
2  
  + 
𝑉𝑘𝑉𝓊(𝑘) sin(𝛿𝓊(𝑘) − 𝛿𝑘)
𝑟𝑘
2 + 𝑥𝑘
2 ,  (10𝑎) 
𝑄𝑘 + 𝐿𝑘
𝑄 =  
𝑥𝑘𝑉𝓊(𝑘)(𝑉𝓊(𝑘) − 𝑉𝑘 cos(𝛿𝓊(𝑘) − 𝛿𝑘))
𝑟𝑘
2 + 𝑥𝑘
2  
+ 
𝑉𝑘𝑉𝓊(𝑘) sin(𝛿𝓊(𝑘) − 𝛿𝑘)
𝑟𝑘
2 + 𝑥𝑘
2 .   (10𝑏) 
In (10), 𝛿𝑘 is the voltage angle at node 𝑘 and 𝓊(𝑘) is the index 
of the node that is immediately upstream of it. 
The expressions in (10) are linearized to simplify the grid 
constraints (see later). We adopt the linearized power flow 
model proposed in [3]. Assuming that |𝑉𝓊(𝑘)|, |𝑉𝑘| ≈ 1 𝑝. 𝑢., 
𝛿𝓊(𝑘) − 𝛿𝑘 ≈ 0, the above equalities are approximated to yield, 
𝑃𝑘 + 𝐿𝑘
𝑃 =  𝑏𝑘
𝑟(𝑉𝓊(𝑘) − 𝑉𝑘) +  𝑏𝑘
𝑥(𝛿𝓊(𝑘) − 𝛿𝑘), (11𝑎) 
𝑄𝑘 + 𝐿𝑘
𝑄 =  𝑏𝑘
𝑥(𝑉𝓊(𝑘) − 𝑉𝑘) −  𝑏𝑘
𝑟(𝛿𝓊(𝑘) − 𝛿𝑘). (11𝑏) 
Here, 
𝑏𝑘
𝑟 =
𝑟𝑘
𝑟𝑘
2 + 𝑥𝑘
2 ,   𝑏𝑘
𝑥 =
𝑥𝑘
𝑟𝑘
2 + 𝑥𝑘
2. 
The expressions in (11) can be represented more concisely in 
the following manner. With  𝑽  and 𝛅  representing the 𝑁 × 1 
vectors of all node voltages and angles, it can be shown that, 
[
𝑷
𝑸
] = 𝐌 [
𝑽
𝛅
] − [𝑳
𝑃
𝑳𝑄
] +  𝐍.       (12) 
In (12),  
𝐌 = [
𝐁𝑟(𝐃T − 𝐈)    𝐁𝑥(𝐃T − 𝐈)
𝐁𝑥(𝐃T − 𝐈)−𝐁𝑟(𝐃T − 𝐈)
] , (13) 
𝐍 = [
𝐁𝑟𝑉0𝐞 + 𝐁
𝑥𝛿0𝐞
𝐁𝑥𝑉0𝐞 + 𝐁
𝑟𝛿0𝐞
] , (14) 
𝐁𝑟 = diag (
𝑟𝑘
𝑟𝑘
2 + 𝑥𝑘
2) , (15𝑎) 
 𝐁𝑥 = diag (
𝑥𝑘
𝑟𝑘
2 + 𝑥𝑘
2).  (15𝑏) 
The matrix 𝐃 called the downstream matrix, is an 𝑁 × 𝑁 
matrix defined as, 
[𝐃]𝑘𝑙 = {
1,
0,
  
       𝑙 ∈ 𝒹(𝑘),   
      otherwise.
    
The substation bus is indexed 0 ∉ 𝒩. Its voltage 𝑉0  and angle 
𝛿0 are treated as constant quantities. 
Node voltages in terms of nodes real and reactive power 
injections, can be obtained from (9) and (12).  
[
𝑽
𝛅
] = 𝐂 ([
𝐓 + 𝐈 𝟎
𝟎 𝐓 + 𝐈
] [𝑳
𝑃
𝑳𝑄
] − [
𝐁𝑟𝑉0𝐞 + 𝐁
𝑥𝛿0𝐞
𝐁𝑥𝑉0𝐞 + 𝐁
𝑟𝛿0𝐞
])
+ 𝐂 [
(𝐓 + 𝐈)𝐀 𝟎
𝟎 (𝐓 + 𝐈)𝐀
] [
𝐩
𝐪] . (16)
 
In (16), 𝐞 is a vector with a 1 appearing as its first entry and all 
others being zeroes. The matrix 𝐂 is obtained according to, 
𝐂 = [
𝐁𝑟(𝐃T − 𝐈) 𝐁𝑥(𝐃T − 𝐈)
𝐁𝑥(𝐃T − 𝐈) −𝐁𝑟(𝐃T − 𝐈)
]
−1
. (17) 
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By applying Taylor’s series expansion around the reference 
points, 𝐩0, 𝐪0, 𝑳0
𝑃, and 𝑳0
𝑄
, linear expressions for the losses can 
be obtained from (2) as shown below, 
𝑳𝑃 = 𝑳0
𝑃 + 𝐉𝑃
𝐿 T(𝐩 − 𝐩0) + 𝐉𝑃
𝐿 Tdiag(𝛉)−1(𝐪 − 𝐪0),      (18𝑎) 
𝑳𝑄 = 𝑳0
𝑄 + 𝐉𝑄
𝐿 T(𝐩 − 𝐩0) + 𝐉𝑄
𝐿 Tdiag(𝛉)−1(𝐪 − 𝐪0).     (18𝑏) 
The matrices 𝐉𝑃
𝐿  and 𝐉𝑄
𝐿  in (18) are Jacobians of the losses in (8), 
so that, 
𝐉𝑃
𝐿 = [
𝜕𝐿𝑙
𝑃
𝜕𝑝𝑘
]
𝑙∈ 𝒩,𝑘∈𝒜
, 𝐉𝑄
𝐿 = [
𝜕𝐿𝑙
𝑄
𝜕𝑞𝑘
]
𝑙∈ 𝒩,𝑘∈𝒜
. 
B.  Jain’s Fairness Index 
The Jain’s fairness index is given by, 
𝐽(𝐱) =
1
1 + ?̂?𝑣2
. (19) 
In (19), 𝐱 = [𝑥𝑖]𝑖=1:𝑛 where each 𝑥𝑖 is an amount of resource 
allocated to any user 𝑖 in a set of 𝑛 users and ?̂?𝑣 is the (biased) 
coefficient of variation of the resources. The index 𝐽 lies in the 
interval [0,1] with higher values indicating more fairness. This 
index can be applied to the present context in a variety of 
ways. The simplest manner to implement fairness would be to 
replace each 𝑥𝑖 above, with an aggregator power 𝑝𝑘. In this 
manner, the fairest allocation would be when all aggregators 
receive an equal amounts of power. Unfortunately, this over-
simplistic version of fairness does not account for the 
difference in the numbers of prosumers in each aggregator. 
However, one important insight can be gained from the above. 
Supplying resources to 𝑚 out of the 𝑛 users (𝑚 < 𝑛) and 
allocating 𝑥𝑖 = 0 to the remaining 𝑛 − 𝑚 would lead to a 
fractional Jain’s index of 𝐽 = 𝑚 𝑛⁄ . This is one of the reasons 
why the aggregators that supply energy are disregarded in 
computing the fairness. 
In this research, Jain’s fairness is determined according to the 
expression below, 
𝐽(𝐧 ∘ 𝐩) =
1
‖𝐳‖1
(𝐧T𝐩)2
‖𝐧 ∘ 𝐩‖2
. (20)    
In (20), 𝐳 is a logical vector of 0 and 1, given by, 
𝐳 = [𝑝𝑘 > 0]𝑘∈𝒜 . . (21) 
Hence, ‖𝐳‖1 is the number of aggregators that receive energy 
from the grid. Those that supply energy (𝑝𝑘 < 0) are set aside 
from fairness considerations. The vector 𝐧 is obtained as the 
following Hadamard product, 
𝐧 = 𝐜∘−1 ∘ [𝐺𝑘]𝑘∈𝒜
∘−1 ∘ 𝐳 .  (22) 
In the absence of any information regarding the size or 
electricity needs of the household associated with each 
prosumer, it is assumed that all prosumers have identical 
demands. Hence 𝐺𝑘 = |𝒢𝑘| is used for in order to allocate 
power to the aggregators that are roughly in proportion to their 
numbers of prosumers. 
The formulation provided in (21) and (22) applies 
proportional fairness to the remaining aggregators, relies on 
proportional fairness, a game theoretic concept where agents in 
an aggregator choose to pay more for energy are allocated 
greater amounts of power. Its effectiveness has been 
demonstrated in [24]. 
C.  DSO Mechanism 
The objective of the DSO is two-fold. It primarily attempts 
to maximize the social welfare 𝟏𝐴
T[𝒲𝑘(𝑝𝑘)]𝑘∈𝒜  of all 
prosumers present in the grid. Next, it tries to price the agents 
as fairly as possible. Hence, the DSO’s objective consists of a 
social welfare term, and an optional regularization term which 
is the Jain’s fairness index in (20), weighted appropriately. 
Accordingly, the DSO mechanism can be formulated as the 
following constrained optimization problem (COP), 
Maximize w.r.t. 𝐩, 
Ω(𝐩) = 𝟏𝐴
T[𝒲𝑘(𝑝𝑘)]𝑘∈𝒜  +   
𝐶
2
𝐽(𝐧 ∘ 𝐩). (23𝑎) 
Subject to, 
−𝐂𝑉𝐩 + 𝐜𝑙
𝑉 ≤ 𝟎, (23𝑏) 
𝐂𝑉𝐩 + 𝐜𝑢
𝑉 ≤ 𝟎, (23𝑐) 
𝐂𝑆𝐩 + 𝐜0
𝑆 ≤ 𝟎, (23𝑑) 
𝐜𝑃0
T
𝐩 + 𝑐0
𝑃0 − 𝑃0 = 0, (23𝑒) 
−𝐜T𝐩 + 𝑐0𝑃0 ≤ 0. (23𝑓) 
The linear equality and inequality constraints (23b) – (23f) are 
obtained directly from the linearization described in Section 
IV.A, with appropriate rearrangements. As this research used 
real power to determine unit costs, they have been expressed 
compactly in terms of the real power which is the primal 
variable 𝐩 = [𝑝𝑘]𝑘∈𝒜 . The inequalities in (23b) and (23c) 
restrict the node voltage deviations to lie within 𝑉0 ± 𝜖, where 
𝑉0 is the voltage substation voltage. Likewise, real, and reactive 
line flow limits are imposed by means of (23d). The equality 
appearing in (23e) is the power balance constraint that ensures 
that 𝑃0, the total power supplied to the DSO by the wholesale 
market equals the sum of the total power demands of the grid’s 
prosumers and the power losses. Lastly, (23f) is the weak 
budget balance constraint that restricts the feasible region to one 
where the DSO payment at a unit cost of 𝑐0 does not exceed the 
total monetary amount that it receives from the aggregators. 
With 𝛂, ?̅?, 𝛃, 𝜆, 𝛾  being dual variables and 𝜂 , an increment 
factor of the augmented Lagrange function, the DSO’s COP is 
expressed as follows, 
𝔏𝑎(𝐩, 𝛂, ?̅?, 𝛃, 𝜆, 𝛾) = ∑ 𝒲𝑘(𝑝𝑘)
𝑘∈𝒜
+   
𝐶
2
𝐽(𝐧 ∘ 𝐩) 
−𝛂T(−𝐂𝑉𝐩 + 𝐜𝑙
𝑉) −
𝜂
2
(−𝐂𝑉𝐩 + 𝐜𝑙
𝑉)T(−𝐂𝑉𝐩 + 𝐜𝑙
𝑉)+ 
−?̅?T(𝐂𝑉𝐩 + 𝐜𝑢
𝑉) −
𝜂
2
(𝐂𝑉𝐩 + 𝐜𝑢
𝑉)T 
−𝛃T(𝐂𝑆𝐩 + 𝐜0
𝑆) −
𝜂
2
(𝐂𝑆𝐩 + 𝐜0
𝑆)T(𝐂𝑆𝐩 + 𝐜0
𝑆)+ 
−𝜆 (𝑪𝑃0
T
𝐩 + 𝑐0
𝑃0 − 𝑃0) −
𝜂
2
(𝑪𝑃0
T
𝐩 + 𝑐0
𝑃0 − 𝑃0)
2
 
−𝛾(−𝐜T𝐩 + 𝑐0𝑃0) 
 −
𝜂
2
(−𝐜T𝐩 + 𝑐0𝑃0)(−𝐜
T𝐩 + 𝑐0𝑃0)+.             (24) 
Equating its derivative ∇𝐩𝔏(𝐩, 𝛌, 𝛏, γ) to zero, and using (6), 
an incremental update rule for the unit cost is obtained as, 
𝐜new ← −𝐂𝑉
T
𝛂 − 𝜂𝐂𝑉
T
(−𝐂𝑉𝐩 + 𝐜𝑙
𝑉)+ 
       +𝐂𝑉
T
𝛂 + 𝜂𝐂𝑉
T
(𝐂𝑉𝐩 + 𝐜𝑢
𝑉)+ 
       +𝐂𝑆
T
𝛃 + 𝜂𝐂𝑆
T
(𝐂𝑆𝐩 + 𝐜0
𝑆)+ 
       +𝜆𝑪𝑃0 + 𝜂(𝑪𝑃0𝐩T + 𝑐0
𝑃0 − 𝑃0)𝑪
𝑃0
T
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       −𝛾𝐜 − 𝜂𝐜(−𝐜T𝐩 + 𝑐0𝑃0)+ 
                  −
𝐶
2
∇𝐩𝐽(𝐧 ∘ 𝐩).                                                   (25) 
In the above expression ∇𝐩𝐽 is the derivative of the Jain’s 
fairness index in (20), with its argument 𝐧 ∘ 𝐩 restricted to the 
positive orthant. It is given by, 
∇𝐩𝐽(𝐧 ∘ 𝐩) =
2
‖𝐧 ∘ 𝐩‖
𝐧 ∘  (√𝐽(𝐧 ∘ 𝐩)
𝟏
‖𝐳‖1
 
−𝐽(𝐧 ∘ 𝐩)
𝐧 ∘ 𝐩
‖𝐧 ∘ 𝐩‖
) . (26) 
The DLMP components of the updated cost 𝐜new  in (25) 
can be readily obtained. Its DLMP components are the voltage 
component, 𝐜𝑉 , the congestion component, 𝐜𝐶 , as well as the 
energy and loss component 𝐜𝐸+𝐿. Additionally, regularization 
introduces a new fairness component, 𝐜𝐹. These are as follows, 
 𝐜𝑉 = −𝐂
𝑉T𝛂 − 𝜂𝐂𝑉
T
(−𝐂𝑉𝐩 + 𝐜𝑙
𝑉)+ 
+𝐂𝑉
T
𝛂 + 𝜂𝐂𝑉
T
(𝐂𝑉𝐩 + 𝐜𝑢
𝑉)+,    (27𝑎) 
𝐜𝐶 = 𝐂
𝑆T𝛃 + 𝜂𝐂𝑆
T
(𝐂𝑆𝐩 + 𝐜0
𝑆)+, (27𝑏) 
𝐜𝐸+𝐿 = 𝜆𝑪
𝑃0 + 𝜂(𝑪𝑃0𝐩T + 𝑐0
𝑃0 − 𝑃0)𝑪
𝑃0
T
.   (27𝑐) 
𝐜𝐹 =  
𝐶
2
∇𝐩𝐽(𝐧 ∘ 𝐩) (27𝑑) 
The unit cost, 𝐜new is therefore the sum of its components, 
𝐜new = 𝐜𝑉 + 𝐜𝐶 + 𝐜𝐸+𝐿 + 𝐜𝐹 .   (28) 
The budget balance term is not provided as in the simulations 
described in the next section, the constraint was inactive at 
convergence, although the DSO’s surplus was negligible. 
The dual variables are updated using dual gradient descent 
as follows, 
𝛂  ← [𝛂 + 𝜂(−𝐂𝑉𝐩 + 𝐜𝑙
𝑉)]
+
, (29𝑎) 
𝛂  ← [𝛂 + 𝜂(𝐂𝑉𝐩 + 𝐜𝑢
𝑉)]+, (29𝑏) 
𝛃 ← [𝛃 + 𝜂(𝐂𝑆𝐩 + 𝐜0
𝑆)]+, (29𝑐) 
𝜆 ← 𝜆 + 𝜂(𝑪𝑃0𝐩 + 𝑐0
𝑃0 − 𝑃0), (29𝑑) 
𝛾 ← 𝛾 + 𝜂(−𝐜T𝐩 + 𝑐0𝑃0). (29𝑒) 
The algorithm terminates only when the updates to 𝐩  are 
such that ‖∆𝐩‖𝟏 ≪ 𝟏 for several consecutive iterations. The 
following proposition argues that termination occurs when the 
global maximum of Ω(𝐩) is reached. 
Conjecture: The objective Ω(𝐩) has a unique global maximum. 
Rationale: It can be shown that the ∇𝐽(𝐩) ≥ 𝟎 and when 𝐩 is 
restricted to the positive orthant, ∇2𝐽(𝐩) ≼ 𝟎. Whence 𝐽(∙) is 
concave and increasing. Under our assumption, the utility 𝑢𝑘
𝑖  
are concave and strictly increasing (see Fig. (2)), so is their sum 
𝒲𝑘  at each aggregator level, and the social welfare term in 
(23𝑎). It follows that Ω(𝐩) has a unique maximum. 
V.  SIMULATION RESULTS 
The model used here was implemented on a modified IEEE 
37-bus system as shown in Fig. 4. There were 17 nodes with 
aggregators (shaded circles in Fig. 4). For clarity, the 
aggregators were indexed separately as A1 − A17 . Three 
separate scenarios were created for this study. In Scenario-I all 
aggregators had 𝐺𝑘 = 10 prosumers, without generation, but 
with 𝑎𝑘
𝑖 , 𝑏𝑘
𝑖 , generated randomly in each case. Scenario-II was 
similar to Scenario-I, except that the number of prosumers was 
doubled in aggregators A3, A9, A11, A17  ( 𝐺𝑘 = 20, 𝑘 =
12,25,27,36 ). In Scenario-III prosumers in aggregators 
A8, A10, A14  ( 𝑘 = 23,26,31 ) were equipped with PV 
generation. Their generations, 𝑔𝑘
𝑖  were obtained randomly. All 
simulations were performed using MATLAB. The bi-level 
mechanism was investigated for each scenario, both without 
and with fairness regularization (𝐶 = 0, 𝐶 = 0.4 in (23a)).  
 
Fig. 4. IEEE 37 bus system with aggregators indexed A1 – A17. 
Fig. 5 (top) shows simulation results obtained from 
Scenarios-I, II, and III. The vertical bars are the power 
allocations of the aggregators that were obtained from the 
simulations. Those without fairness regularization appear in 
blue, (𝑝𝑘) while those with regularization are in yellow (𝑝𝑘
∗). 
The unit costs of the aggregators without fairness (𝑐𝑘) and with 
fairness (𝑐𝑘
∗) are also provided in solid and dotted lines.  
From Fig. 4 it can be seen that aggregators A1, A9, A10 are 
positioned close to the substation bus. Consequently, when not 
regularized for fairness the mechanism outputs costs where 
these aggregators are sold energy at lower rates and therefore 
enjoy higher power allocations. In contrast, 
A5, A6, A15, A16, A17 experience higher unit costs and lower 
power allocations. Fig. 5 shows how regularization helps in 
mitigating this adverse effect. Fairness causes aggregators to be 
charged in a more equitable manner.  
The breakdown of the unit costs into its DLMP components 
is also shown in Fig. 5 (bottom). These are shown as stacked 
bars colored purple for the fairness component (𝐜𝐹), light blue 
for the unit cost due to energy usage and loss (𝐜𝐸+𝐿), green for 
unit costs of congestion (𝐜𝐶), and yellow when the voltage limit 
constraints (𝐜𝑉) are active. 
The DLMP components in Fig. 5 sheds further insights into 
the discrepancies in the unit costs. It is seen that the voltage 
components are very low for the three aggregators A1, A9, A10 
located close to the substation. This is because voltage 
constraints are active further downstream in the grid, causing 
an increase in the voltage cost components in those aggregators 
(A5, A6, A15, A16, A17).  
These are the aggregators that are furthest from the 
substation (Fig. 4). The mitigating effect of regularizing the 
DSO’s objective is evident from the DLMP components in Fig. 
5. The algorithm provides discounted unit costs to the spatially 
disadvantaged aggregators, which is made up by incrementing 
the three aggregators in the substation’s neighborhood. 
Fig. 6 shows results of Scenario-II with twice the agents 
present in aggregators A3, A9, A11, A17 as elsewhere, allowing 
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one to examine the effects of congestion. The rationale behind 
this choice of aggregators is to the wide range of their locations 
vis-à-vis the substation, with A9, A11 being closest to it, A3 
further away and A17 located at a large distance. 
 
Fig. 5. Results of Scenario-I showing unit costs and allocated power 
to each aggregator (top) and the DLMP components (bottom). 
 
Fig. 6. Results of Scenario-II showing unit costs and allocated power 
to each aggregator (top) and the DLMP components (bottom). 
 
Fig. 7. Results of Scenario-II showing unit costs and allocated power 
to each aggregator (top) and the DLMP components (bottom). 
A similar pattern as before is observed in Fig. 6, with 
distances having a severe impact on the unit costs. Increased 
loads in some aggregators causes congestion. Consequently, in 
the absence of regularization, aggregators yields higher unit 
costs for aggregators A4, A5, A6, A15, A16, A17  due to their 
distance than the others, as well as in comparison to what they 
were charged in Scenario-I. 
The DLMP components elucidate the effect of higher 
congestion. Aggregators A4, A5, A6, A15, A16, A17 are priced 
at higher levels (𝐜𝐶). The significantly lower unit cost of A1 and 
to a lesser extent, A9, A10  due to their closeness to the 
substation, is evident. Supplementing the DSO’s objective with 
Jain’s index helps alleviate the pricing disparity. The previously 
advantaged aggregators see the highest unit costs due to the 
fairness component (𝐜𝐹). Conversely, those furthest away are 
able to increase their demands due to the lowered costs.  
The effects of the penetration of PV generation in 
aggregators A8, A10, A14 diminishes the undesirable influence 
of congestion in voltage deviations throughout the distribution 
grid. Due to their PV generations, and resultant lower demands, 
the fairness component rewards them with highest drop in unit 
costs. This is seen in Fig. 7. Other aggregators also benefit from 
the introduction of PV generation in the grid in comparison the 
unit costs without fairness shown in Fig. 7. The congestion 
costs (𝐜𝐶) are uniformly lower than in the previous case. The 
DLMP components of the unit costs in this figure shows how 
regularization tries to rectify locational discrepancies. 
 
Fig. 8. Total welfare and price of fairness vs Jain’s fairness 
index 
Lastly, the tradeoff between welfare and fairness, which is 
very well quantified in econometric and game-theory literature, 
is briefly addressed. Scenario-II was simulated when the 
regularization weight 𝐶  was varied between 𝐶 = 0  and 𝐶 =
0.5  in increments of 0.02 . The results are shown in Fig. 8 
clearly illustrating the tradeoff. Increasing fairness 𝐽(𝐧 ∘ 𝐩) is 
associated with a simultaneous decrease in the social welfare, 
𝟏𝐴
T[𝒲𝑘(𝑝𝑘)]𝑘∈𝒜 , as seen in Fig. 8 (left). Fig. 8 (right) shows 
the same phenomenon in terms of the price of fairness – the 
reduction in social welfare from regularization expressed as a 
fraction of the maximum social welfare sans regularization, 
 
1 −
𝐽(𝐧 ∘ 𝐩)
max
𝐩
𝟏𝐴
T[𝒲𝑘(𝑝𝑘)]𝑘∈𝒜
. 
Fortunately, even in the extreme case (𝐶 = 0.5), the price 
of fairness is approximately equal to 0.04, i.e. an acceptable 
4% reduction in the entire grid’s social welfare. 
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VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
This research entails innovations along several directions. It 
is privacy preserving, in that it attains the global maximum of 
Ω(𝐩) in (23), without any knowledge about the prosumers’ 
parameters. This is because the bidding process taking place 
between the prosumers and the aggregators allows the gradient 
∇𝐩Ω(𝐩) to be computed. The use of dual decomposition helps 
in dissociating the various DLMP component of the unit costs. 
The application of Jain’s fairness index in a distribution 
system and derivation of its component for DLMP is, to the best 
of the authors’ knowledge, novel. It was shown to apportion 
energy to the aggregators in a more equitable manner. In 
addition, again to the best of the authors’ knowledge, the use of 
Jain’s index within the gradient descent algorithm is novel.  
There are a few limitations of the research described here. 
The rate of convergence was not investigated properly. When 
the initialization was entirely arbitrarily, the gradient descent 
would start an infeasible region that was very far away from the 
active feasible manifold. Therefore the number of steps 
required before termination was of the order of 105. A large 
speedup can be accomplished with enhancements to the basic 
ALM used herein or replacing it with a faster algorithm. 
However, the authors believe that in a real world setting with 
multiple time slots, using the outputs of each time slot 𝑡 as the 
initial values of 𝐩, 𝐜, even the dual variables to initialize the 
next, 𝑡 + 1, would yield several orders of magnitude speedups. 
Linearization was used for mathematical convenience, 
computational simplicity, and as linear constraints guarantee 
unique maxima. However, the approximation error in the output 
must be quantified for a more thorough assessment of the 
approach’s performance. However, it should be noted that the 
outputs of some simulations were compared with actual power 
flow. The largest errors were in the line voltages, which was 
very acceptable at the order of 10−3. 
Finally, a more rigorous investigation into Jain’s index 
needs to be performed, specifically its comparison with other 
possible methods to quantify fairness (such as the generalized 
curves in [16], [17], or entropy-based measures). 
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